What I found most interesting in Sandel's consideration of
loyalty dilemmas was his discussion of patriotism. Sandel cites Jean-Jacques Rousseau's argument
that communal attachments, such as patriotism, are vitally important to an idea
of universal humanity. Rousseau argues,
though, that we are limited in our ability to sympathize. He writes, "It seems that the sentiment
of humanity evaporates and weakens in being extended over the entire
world." I thought this was
fascinating. He seems almost to suggest
we should feel a sense of universal
humanity, but it is an ideal that is, because of our limited capacity to
sympathize, impossible. For this reason,
patriotism is important because it encourages us to sympathize with one
another.
It seems problematic, though (and Sandel mentions this, too),
that patriotism also compels us to place more concern upon those within our community,
whatever that community may be, than those in other communities. It's a complex problem. We cannot sympathize with everyone, so it is good that we practice
sympathizing with, for example, other Americans. Doing so is good, because it means we feel a
communal responsibility, but it also means that we perhaps unrealistically
overvalue those within our community.
This complicates our sympathy for the rest of the world. Patriotism means that we feel an obligation
toward one another that is stronger our obligation toward others. To me, this actually seems to discourage our sense of universal
humanity.
Strong patriotism is good for the country, but if Rousseau
is correct that we ought to feel a
connection to every human being (and our patriotism is just that feeling as
far-reaching as it can go--only to
the boundaries of one's country), then too-strong patriotism does something
wrong by obscuring our feelings about other countries by imploring us to value
one another, as Americans, over every other human being.
Rousseau seems to suggest that we ought to feel this kind of
sympathy with the world, but because we cannot, patriotism is a good
substitute. Really, though, it seems
like we would be more compelled toward universal humanity if we did not value
citizenship in the same country as some special connection requiring special
loyalty. By valuing one another over
other people, we're actually making universal humanity even less possible. It seems to me that, if it is the ideal, we
should seek to achieve it, even if we can't fully get there. If Rousseau is right, I mean, we should
encourage a more communal vision of the world.
I think Rousseau is probably right that we cannot feel tied
to everyone, but so often we see near-religious patriotism causing
strong antagonism between countries. I
think we, as humans, want to feel communal
ties, but perhaps we cannot expand those beyond the borders of our country, and
unfortunately this causes us lots of problems.
What are your thoughts?
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