The Categorical Imperative and Lying to Murderers

In class earlier today, we discussed the categorical imperative, the supreme ethical principle of Immanuel Kant.  This categorical imperative has three parts:

1. act only in such a way that you could will the maxim of your actions as a universal law
2. act only in such a way that you always treat humanity (whether in your own person or another person) never as a means but as an end itself
3. act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends

These three sub-principles make up the categorical imperative.  For Kant, every human being is considered a rational and free actor.  Further, he developed his supreme ethical principle while considering what reason demands for a rational thinker, or for a human.

For most scenarios, Kant's categorical imperative holds up.  For instance, a rational thinker would not impose the universal law of 'stealing is good' on society, therefore, that rational thinker would not steal.  Stealing is thus morally reprehensible.  What about killing?  The rational thinker does not wish to live in a society where murder is morally upright.  Therefore, killing is morally reprehensible.
These types of moral statements seem very appealing.  But, as we saw in class, the application of Kant's categorical imperative does not always produce desirable results.

The Anne Frank scenario we discussed is a clear example of this.  To rehash: you live in Nazi-occupied Europe.  Some Jews are hiding in your attic.  The S.S. have just come to your door and asked if there are any Jews with you.

Following Kant's categorical imperative, you cannot lie.  To do so would infringe on the first sub-principle.  So you must tell the Nazi that there are Jews in your attic.  For Kant, when one tells the truth, one is no longer responsible for the consequences (whereas if one lies, one is fully responsible for the consequences).

Philosopher Benjamin Constant first pointed out this flaw in Kant's categorical imperative.  If a murderer comes to your house, he asked, and demands to know if your friend is home, and you know that the murderer intends to murder your friend, do you tell the murderer the truth?  Kant replied to this objection in On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns.

From that essay: "...if by telling a lie you have in fact hindered someone who was even now planning a murder, then you are legally responsible for all the consequences that might result therefrom. But if you have adhered strictly to the truth, then public justice cannot lay a hand on you, whatever the unforeseen consequence might be. It is indeed possible that after you have honestly answered Yes to the murderer's question as to whether the intended victim is in the house, the latter went out unobserved and thus eluded the murderer, so that the deed would not have come about. However, if you told a lie and said that the intended victim was not in the house, and he has actually (though unbeknownst to you) gone out, with the result that by so doing he has been met by the murderer and thus the deed has been perpetrated, then in this case you may be justly accused as having caused his death. For if you had told the truth as best you knew it, then the murderer might perhaps have been caught by neighbors who came running while he was searching the house for his intended victim, and thus the deed might have been prevented. Therefore, whoever tells a lie, regardless of how good his intentions may be, must answer for the consequences resulting therefrom even before a civil tribunal and must pay the penalty for them, regardless of how unforeseen those consequences may be. This is because truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of such duties would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the slightest exception to them were admitted."

For Kant, then, to lie in such a situation is to assume responsibility for all the multitude of consequences that would result from such a lie. How many of the murderer's subsequent actions would then be the result of your lie?  Would the guilt of those actions rest equally on your hands, as well as the murderer's?  This brings to mind Aristotle's view on justice, wherein an agent is responsible for injustice if it is done with knowledge of the actions and the outcome resulting.  Would Kant disagree with Aristotle's views on injustice, then?

Much of Kant's argument against lying to the murderer is based in avoiding legal and moral responsibility for the murderer's actions.  I don't find much moral solace in telling the truth if it leads to my friend's death, however.  Does circumstantial judgement supersede ethical absolutes?

Source: http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/KANTsupposedRightToLie.pdf