There is an inherent problem in the consequentialist nature of utilitarian calculus. As many of the Kantians argued during the symposium on Wednesday, the consequences of an action are never possible to ascertain absolutely. A utilitarian might argue that the direct results of most actions are foreseeable. For those actions that do not have clearly foreseeable consequences, though, what does the utilitarian prescribe? This problem is further complicated if we take into account the logic of chaos theory, and the echoing effects of our actions on our environment and our co-rational actors. (A common example of chaos theory: a butterfly fluttering its wings in Mexico will, through an extensive chain of cause and effect, cause a natural disaster on the other side of the globe. This 'domino effect' is the basis of chaos theory.) So how does utilitarianism take into account the 'domino effect' consequences of our actions? Is the immediate result the only determinant of an action's morality? Further, if an action breeds unintended consequences that detract from the general utility, does that make the action inherently immoral?
Another problem I have come upon while using utilitarian logic is the absence of a standardized measurement of one's happiness. For utilitarians, if you'll recall, the preferable action is the one that yields the most happiness or pleasure for the greatest number of individuals. Despite this, there is no quantifiable measurement for happiness, pleasure, or pain. This further complicates the absence of an objective utilization of utilitarian calculus. Every utilitarian calculation has an inherent bias on the part of the calculator, even though the general idea of utilitarianism is an unbiased, calculatory morality. While normally an absence of quantifiable measurement would not detract from a moral philosophy (in my opinion, anyway), utilitarianism is based upon such calculations. It's much like trying to define and use algebra in a world without numbers.
What is your opinion on utilitarianism? Do you think my objections are justified, or are they totally missing the mark?
I think you make good points! There are many situations in which one could not comfortably assume the outcome of an action, and this seems really problematic for Mill. I had myself been wondering what would happen if one failed to correctly predict the future--if I push the fat man off the bridge with the best of intentions, but he falls to his death beside (not in front of) the train, I have killed a man for no god end. Do intentions matter, then? Was my action immoral because I failed in my attempt?
ReplyDeleteConsidering your first objection, I think Mill might say that we are supposed to employ utilitarian thinking to our actions, and this will generally have a beneficial result. We cannot predict the future, but if we consider the possible consequences of every action we take, we will be more likely to do what is beneficial for humankind. So, yes, I think for Mill that the immediate result is the determinant of an action's morality. We can only assess the morality of a situation insofar as we can assess an actor's ability to anticipate certain consequences.
Utilitarianism is difficult for me because I want a standard of justice that everyone can be expected to uphold, but if we must look at every individual situation, it becomes messy quickly.