Sunday, October 28, 2012

Kelsen/Mill Tag Team


Kelsen’s entire argument is centered around three points, the first of which I will focus:
- Moral values are relative
- Justice is social happiness
- Individuals and societies view Justice as an absolute that transcends human comprehension

Sidenote: Because Kelsen takes the stance that Justice is a social happiness, I think we can bridge his philosophy with Utilitarianism. So, refocusing on moral relativism...

In class, we talked about the hierarchal system we naturally (?) place on values. The in-class example was skipping out on an exam to attend a funeral, in which the hypothetical person valued the obligation of being at the funeral over being in class. We naturally rank our various values because there are so many we hold close to us. If we didn’t rank them, we’d probably too overwhelmed and wouldn’t be able to make up our mind on anything! How could we decide that being at the funeral is more important than taking an exam without this system (which is unique to ever individual, who knows, maybe there are some folks out there who decided to stay on campus instead of attending the funeral)?

Anyways, this is a big element to Kelsen’s piece, but he gives literally no guidance on how to go about ranking them. Yes, he makes it clear that morals are relative, but that’s pretty much it. How can he argue that one’s values are completely up to the individual, oh, and by the way, reason has nothing to do with the ranking system?

This is where I’d like to push Mill into the scene. Mill’s *Utilitarianism* gives an outline as to how we should go about ranking our values so that even if morality is truly relative, we can at least come to some consensual understanding of each others’ actions. Mill connects values to pleasures and pains, and since these are usually the main contributing factors in our actions, I think it’s relevant to my question.

Briefly, Mill’s method/hierarchy of pleasures/pains is as follows (highest -> lowest):
  1. Pleasures/pains of the intellect
  2. “ “ of moral sentiment
  3. “ “ of feelings/imagination
  4. “ “ of mere sensation

Using this line up, we can contemplate on the goods and bads of an action’s outcome (pleasures/pains) and if there is an imbalance, we can determine whether or not an action should be done (i.e. Whether or not it is moral).

My thought, then is: Even if morality is relative unto each of us, can we supplement Kelsen with Mill, or something like his method? Since (according to Kelsen) we are striving for an absolute Justice, and morality is based on an innate human drive, *can* we subscribe to *any* form of universal hierarchy? Or must this “universal” be limited to nations individually? Fun Fact: we tried to implement something like Mill’s hierarchy on an in-class project (another class), and the 20 of us couldn’t even concede on a standard hierarchy.

So I guess now I should ask, does it really matter our individual ranking system? Or does it only matter when my system clashes with yours and you think I’ve done something wrong that I’ve considered totally within my means to do?

2 comments:

  1. This is an interesting question and I think it could have to do a little with what Carrie was blogging about in that it is easier to follow a master than to be your own (phrased much better by her). I think it is a little circular in that our individual ranking systems matter on the basis that they do line up, or at least close, to some of the already layed out moral issues.

    I think in turn there only really arises an issue when there is some moral asstranged system that clashes with the rest. I do agree however that using Kelsen's ideals it does not seem possible to begin to find a solution that could be physically carried out.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Although I think there are some technicalities to dispute over your suggestion, the idea that we could substitute a logical, result based approach to choosing our value systems is certainly intriguing. Although I’m not sure if Kelsen would agree with your opinion on how we determine our values, I think this is yet another point against Kelsen’s perspective. Are values really so subjective that we could not rationalize the implications of holding certain values in higher regard than others? We have already identified the real world problems with using a strict Kantian morality- certainly valuing certain principles over other one could hold more harm than good. I find it particularly interesting ho we determine the values we hold with regards to other individuals- what values would we hold if we were forced to understand their implications for others? Obviously we are incapable of truly understanding another’s existence, but by keeping that in mind, we might be able to bring a more objective nature to our decisions.

    ReplyDelete