Sunday, October 28, 2012

Kelsen/Mill Tag Team


Kelsen’s entire argument is centered around three points, the first of which I will focus:
- Moral values are relative
- Justice is social happiness
- Individuals and societies view Justice as an absolute that transcends human comprehension

Sidenote: Because Kelsen takes the stance that Justice is a social happiness, I think we can bridge his philosophy with Utilitarianism. So, refocusing on moral relativism...

In class, we talked about the hierarchal system we naturally (?) place on values. The in-class example was skipping out on an exam to attend a funeral, in which the hypothetical person valued the obligation of being at the funeral over being in class. We naturally rank our various values because there are so many we hold close to us. If we didn’t rank them, we’d probably too overwhelmed and wouldn’t be able to make up our mind on anything! How could we decide that being at the funeral is more important than taking an exam without this system (which is unique to ever individual, who knows, maybe there are some folks out there who decided to stay on campus instead of attending the funeral)?

Anyways, this is a big element to Kelsen’s piece, but he gives literally no guidance on how to go about ranking them. Yes, he makes it clear that morals are relative, but that’s pretty much it. How can he argue that one’s values are completely up to the individual, oh, and by the way, reason has nothing to do with the ranking system?

This is where I’d like to push Mill into the scene. Mill’s *Utilitarianism* gives an outline as to how we should go about ranking our values so that even if morality is truly relative, we can at least come to some consensual understanding of each others’ actions. Mill connects values to pleasures and pains, and since these are usually the main contributing factors in our actions, I think it’s relevant to my question.

Briefly, Mill’s method/hierarchy of pleasures/pains is as follows (highest -> lowest):
  1. Pleasures/pains of the intellect
  2. “ “ of moral sentiment
  3. “ “ of feelings/imagination
  4. “ “ of mere sensation

Using this line up, we can contemplate on the goods and bads of an action’s outcome (pleasures/pains) and if there is an imbalance, we can determine whether or not an action should be done (i.e. Whether or not it is moral).

My thought, then is: Even if morality is relative unto each of us, can we supplement Kelsen with Mill, or something like his method? Since (according to Kelsen) we are striving for an absolute Justice, and morality is based on an innate human drive, *can* we subscribe to *any* form of universal hierarchy? Or must this “universal” be limited to nations individually? Fun Fact: we tried to implement something like Mill’s hierarchy on an in-class project (another class), and the 20 of us couldn’t even concede on a standard hierarchy.

So I guess now I should ask, does it really matter our individual ranking system? Or does it only matter when my system clashes with yours and you think I’ve done something wrong that I’ve considered totally within my means to do?

Saturday, October 27, 2012

The Dangers of Moral Absolutism



            While scouring the web, I came across a TED talk by Sam Harris. In this talk he attempts to defend the idea that every moral question can have a scientific answer—by that, he means a “yes” or “no” answer. Harris believes that the separation between science and human values is an illusion—he believes that values contain facts (science). He gives the example of increased compassion towards more genetically evolved organisms—we care about monkeys more than ants and ants more than rocks because more genetically evolved organisms have a higher range or happiness or consciousness. He says that this is an example where facts (more genetically evolved = higher range of emotions) intermingle with values (compassion). Harris then introduces more examples of terrible consequences of not following his values.
On the surface, moral absolutism seems like a great idea. If we have answers to the most intriguing moral questions then it will make our judicial system more streamlined and it will also help us make better decisions. But, there are a few problems with living in a morally absolute state. First, I believe that moral absolutism makes people more intolerant. If a person lives in a morally absolute society then they will clash with the societies around them, clashes lead to disagreements and disagreements lead to wars. So a society with a morally absolute philosophy would never be in peace because of the continuous conflicts that will arise with other societies. Why would this happen? Because a moral absolutist who believes that all lies are immoral will clash with a man who lied in order to save a life. That brings me to my second point: is there really ever an absolute? Let’s say, for example, that lying is wrong. A moral absolutist will say that ALL lying is wrong. Well, would it be wrong of me to lie to a Nazi about the Jews I’m hiding in my attic? A moral absolutist will say yes, you should never lie. A moral absolutist would give up Anne and let her die. So, as we can see from that example, what’s moral at one point might not be moral at another point. That is the basis of moral relativism.
Moral relativism states that morality of an action depends upon an individual’s beliefs and what kind of culture he or she is in. So, we can say that a woman wearing a veil is wrong, but that is only from our perspective, it might be completely alright from the other society’s perspective. I tend to agree more with moral relativism because it gives a different answer to morality in different circumstances. Our actions don’t always happen under one circumstance but they happen under many different circumstances. Just like the circumstances differ, the answer to the question of morality of each action should differ too.

Friday, October 26, 2012

Allusions!


I am on board with Kelsen, when it comes that there is not just an absolute justice, but that it is just human interest. I completely agree with this tenant of Kelsen’s definition of justice, because why otherwise would there be some many philosophers, with such diverse ideas? We are, by nature, self-interested animals.

Individuality is what we like to call our thoughts and the way we treat topics, but in all honesty, it is nothing more than self-interest. We are taught to be open to other belief systems and opposing arguments, but at the end of the day, who does not want to be correct or prove that their thoughts are the right ones?

Absolute justice is an allusion. I do not think that that is the only allusion however, that can be pointed out by Kelsen’s theory. What about the allusion of tolerance? Are people truly tolerant, or are we just trying to cause the most amount of happiness in society but not always stepping on other people’s toes? Has our society become too tolerant? Is there no longer any more room for correction, or is that just being intolerant in our society?

I heard the other day that one school in the US does not call there students freshman anymore, but rather first-year-students. The reason behind this change is because the word “men” in freshmen is not sexually tolerant. I personally think this is too far, and that the nation is running a little too wild waving the “politically correct” flag!

What is your thoughts?

Relativism and Politics


As the Presidential candidates have been campaigning, the American people have listened to a storm of ads and debates. The candidates have each said a good deal about their policies and plans for the future, but it is a common criticism that they are just pandering to the base at different points. A question arises from this: is it just for candidates to present themselves in a different way than they either are or intend to be? To briefly address this problem, it will be beneficial to use the relativistic logic of Hans Kelsen.
          To begin with, it should be noted that the relativistic system cannot objectively say whether it is just for politicians to misrepresent themselves, but it does provide an interesting point about the freedom of ideas necessary in a democratic society. Kelsen very explicitly argues for both freedom and tolerance. He defines tolerance as being “…the sympathetic understanding of the religious or political beliefs of others- without accepting them, but not preventing them from being freely expressed” (Hackett, 203). This creates an interesting dilemma for me, which is the question of whether or not it is acceptable to lie or deceive.
Relativism posits that there are many possible systems of morality and justice, and it is likely that some of these systems contain different views on what is or is not acceptable. We as individuals are therefore the ones to decide if a certain system works or not, which is very similar to a political election. This returns us to the original question: would Kelsen argue that the intentional deception of the candidates is acceptable? This highlights an interesting problem in his arguments, which is that he provides no criteria for distinguishing between the merits of various systems. This is a major problem, especially in the case given regarding candidates, because it can turn the problem into a very circular one. While it could be argued that it is just as long as the candidates each follow their own moral code, we would all agree that this is a terrible system for comparing what is and is not just. This could be construed to break his principle of tolerance, but on the other hand, his principle of tolerance upholds the right for people to deceive. 

Though, I may have just misread what Kelsen said. Do any of you have any thoughts or comments?  

Kelsen's Criticism

     I do have quite a few questions and obvious flaws that I see in our previous philosophers that we studied, but Kelsen brings his critiques of other teachings to the forefront of his philosophy.  I think it is odd that such a large portion of the reading we had was talking about how other philosophers are wrong. Especially when there are several blatant flaws with Kelsen's philosophy.  For example, the idea of justice being social happiness can't always work because there will be conflicting wants and needs and what makes people happy might not be what is right.  I think that it is wrong for Kelsen to critique these great philosophers so openly because they can't defend themselves, and also they laid the foundation for what he is trying to do. Do you agree or disagree?
     I think that there is some real substance in his arguments and they are very intriguing but it is just odd to me that a philosopher would spend more ink on critiquing others rather then coming up with a definite set of rules for himself.  Now this could just be the article that we read, but it seemed like he was lacking a real set of defining rules explaining his stand point on justice.  
   In what aspects do you think Kelsen's writings are different then the ones that we have recently talked about? Do you like this style more then the others?  If yes why? If no what don't you like?

Sandel, Kelsen, and Government


            Sandel claims in his article entitled Democracy’s Discontent that “government should not legislate morality because all morality is merely subjective”. I feel that this statement is explained by Kelsen’s views on how it is hard to find a truly just transaction between two independent entities. Kelsen describes a number of situations in where the just transaction of to groups often results in the negative affect on another, like two men fighting over the love of woman.
            Sandel and Kelsen both would agree on the point that a utilitarian approach to government would not work because of the near impossibility to define the good especially when it comes to a number of people that can equal the population of an entire country. This leaves us with more of a Kantian approach where the pleasures and action of one are not denying the rights of others in the society. This leads to a more neutral approach to morality. I am sure that most are willing accept a willed maxim of action that fell in line with another’s morality as long as it did not affect their own. Unfortunately there will inevitably be instances where the will of a maxim will conflict with another’s morality.
            I feel that this most often happens when we start to dig into Kelsen’s idea of competing interests. He claims that if we rank our interests and values there will be no need for justice, because everything will be prioritized. This prioritization creates a justification for our actions. We talked about in class that the key to understanding Kelsen’s logic is to understand the difference between a value and a fact. Just because you have a value that you live by does not mean it is a fact. If morality is dependent on each individual human being than no one can will his or her individual values to be fact. This misunderstanding between fact and value has caused the government to believe that they need to step in and create a final end to some sort of moral thing to do which is the worst thing that they could possibly do. With larger issues that take place, even in modern American society like abortion or gay marriage, just because someone takes a moral position on the subject does not make it fact. Government should stay neutral by opening the law to as include a large amount of possible choices for the American citizen, so that positions of morality are not tried to be made fact by law.

Social Happiness for the Sake of Values?

On Wednesday we talked about Kelsin's theory that justice is not a set in stone philosophy.  He argues that justice is "social happiness".  This does not, however, mean individual happiness because everyone cannot be made equally happy in a situation.  He goes on to argue that we as humans have this desire for an ultimate say on things - an absolute truth.  In seeking the absolute truth, we transfer it to some transcendental rhelm that is inaccessible to human cognition.

When one steps back and examines the human formation of the idea of an absolute truth, it seems almost counterproductive.  We have this idea that we are governed by this absolute truth, but we are never able to reach it.  For example, with many religions, we spend our entire lives "on a journey" to become closer or better know a higher power, but never actually reaching it.  We blame it on our inherent evil or the fact that no one is perfect, but why do we strive to be?

Kelsin would say that one of the reasons humans form this transcendental rhelm of truth is that is it easier to obey a master than be one's own master.  Take for example Dr. Johnson's discussion of abortion on Wednesday.  I bet if you walked down the street and asked people whether or not they thought abortion was acceptable, many of the one's who would argue against it would claim that the reason it is abhorrent is that it is not God's will.  But this is not a conclusion that the person has come based off of his or her own judgments.  So in essence, it is not a valid argument.

Now whether or not abortion is right or wrong is not the point.  The point is that it is acceptable in our society to claim a set of values based on some higher power who's methods one can knowingly never comprehend.  Why is human nature inclined to do this?  I feel that just like how people gravitate to a system of government, people gravitate to a system of preset values.  It is easier to accept the belief system of the ones around you rather than step back and create your own.  And even creating your own is subject to the influences of the values of one's society, family, friends, and school.  And though social  happiness is important, the happiness of others for the sake of developing our own values should not be our ultimate goal as humans.

An Argument Against Relativism and Where It Falls Short

I recently found an article by Paul Boghossian on moral relativism and moral eliminativism.  He makes the argument that, when an individual realizes that a moral value is not an absolute moral fact, the individual will either adopt a relativistic or an eliminativistic approach.  The relativistic approach stipulates that a value can only be "right" or "wrong" relative to the moral code under which it is evaluated.  For a relativist, there is no absolute "right" or "wrong".

Boghossian wonders why one would adopt a relativistic approach instead of an eliminativistic one.  For the eliminativist, the absence of an absolute moral value indicates that one should drop the normative terms of "right" and "wrong" altogether.  Obviously, if there is not an absolute "right" or "wrong," then there is no way for us to measure the "rightness" or "wrongness" of an action.  Boghossian equates this with moral nihilism.

In the article, Boghossian compares the former case (that of adopting relativism) to the changes that occurred when we learned of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity.  According to the theory, there is no such thing as the absolute simultaneity of two events; no two events ever occur at exactly the same time, but always relative to the viewer.  We haven't abandoned the concept of time altogether because of this revelation, though.  Instead, its understood that simultaneity still exists, just "relative to a (spatio-temporal) frame of reference" (original quote in Boghossian article).

Boghossian gives an example of the latter (that of adopting eliminativism) using the case of witches.  Witches aren't real.  When we learned this, we did not began to say that witches are not real relative to one's moral code; witches simply aren't real.

So why did we reject witches as a concept altogether, but not simultaneity?  Boghossian postulates that it is because simultaneity has a "relativistic cousin" -- that is, simultaneity according to one's frame of reference -- whereas witches do not.  [[I'd like to interject here and -- at the risk of sounding trite -- mention that comparing the revelation that witches do not exist to that of Einstein's Theory of Relativity is like comparing apples and oranges.  It also assumes that as a society we came together in consensus right away about witches and, later, came together in an immediate consensus on Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity.  This is obviously not the case, and bastardizes the history behind the societal impact caused by each revelation.  But I digress.]]  Boghossian wonders if there is a relativistic cousin to "right" and "wrong", and whether that cousin could be used as a moral substitute of sorts.

Later Boghossian goes on to describe the relativism of etiquette in order to compare it to moral relativism.  The relativism of etiquette demonstrates that, while the kinds of manners and behaviors we ought to adopt depends largely on the region, the goal in all cases of relativistic etiquette is to avoid offending one's hosts.  If one takes this as a parallel to moral relativism, as Boghossian does, then it goes to show that there are some moral absolutes.  And if a moral relativist finds that there are indeed some moral values which are absolute, then that will lead them, Boghossian argues, from moral relativism to moral absolutism.  On the other hand, if a moral relativist rejects all absolute moral values, Boghossian argues, then that leads to moral nihilism or moral eliminativism.

I have one big issue with Boghossian's argument: he fails to mention the "strong" relativistic process of "ranking" values.  In fact, most of his argument is against the kind of "lazy relativism" that Dr. J often warns us about.  Boghossian seems to think that, without absolute moral values, an individual is bound to slip into moral nihilism, where morality is meaningless.  On the contrary, a relativist must justify the values and beliefs that they hold by appealing to logical and moral arguments, instead of making an appeal to authority or to an absolute value system (both are essentially the same thing, i.e. relegating your moral choice to another authority).  It is through this independent justification of moral values that the moral relativist avoids moral nihilism and moral absolutism, if we are considering relativism to be a halfway point between those two, instead of what it truly is: a superior alternative.

Sam Harris: Science Can Answer Moral Questions


After reading Kelsen and discussing the ways that value judgments are different from facts, I was reminded of this TED Talk I saw a few months ago.  Sam Harris is a scholar of “New Atheism” (like some famous atheist scholars you may have heard of—Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens).  He writes and talks about a lot of interesting theological/philosophical/scientific ideas, and these are fascinating. 

In this talk, Harris argues that “the separation between science and human values is an illusion.”  As you can see, this applies directly to our discussion of Kelsen.  Harris believes we can answer moral questions with science, with facts.  The common belief is that because science deals with empirical claims, it does not translate well into making normative ones.  Harris suggests that morality, like any science, has factual right and wrong answers, and we can determine them.  

Have a look (even a brief one), and let me know what you think.  



I found it interesting that he seems to suggest that there are factual answers, and it is important for us to know them (and converge on them), but he stops there.  He doesn’t seem to do much to suggest we have moral obligations.  How do you view this in light of Kelsen?  Would he agree that some moral questions are actually factual questions?  Do you see flaws in Harris’s argument?  Do you think, if Harris is right, that we could ever all accept any moral suggestions as fact?


How to Define Justice


This year we have read many different philosophers definitions of justice, but not until now have we read anything about there not being a true definition of justice. At first, the idea of there not being a definition of justice was unappealing, but after looking into Kelsen’s argument further I found that he has some very good points. Kelsen brings up the point that there is a difference between values and fact and justice more often than not deals with values than fact; because of this, values are determined by judgment. Since rational people have different views on things it is hard to set a true definition of justice. This is not to say that because people have different views that there is no justice or injustice, just that you can’t make a definite definition on something that is arrived at by judgment. Do you agree with Kelsen that there is no true definition of justice? If you disagree what philosophers definition of justice to you most agree with, or what is your own definition of justice?

Libertarian Justice


In Michael Sandel’s Democracy Discontent he questions how the libertarian objection could be met when placed in a community setting.  Sandel notes,” The liberal case for public provision seems well suited to conditions in which strong communal ties cannot be relied on, and this is one source of its appeal. But it lies vulnerable nonetheless to the libertarian objection that redistributive policies use some people as means to others’ ends, and so  offend the “plurality and distinctness” of individuals that liberalism seeks above all to secure. (334)” Sandel confirms that some ethics of sharing under liberalism could function if everyone shared the same ideals, however humans acting as rational beings will have their own subjective agendas. Sandel states, “Its claim on me is not the claim of a community with which I identify, but rather the claim of an arbitrarily defined collectivity whose aims I may or may not share. (334)” If there is a neutral government on social matters then who would have the authority to hinder the liberties of the majority from overpowering the liberties of the minorities because they simply do not share the same aspires, such as Jim Crow laws?

Monday, October 22, 2012

Fact Checkers

After you've watched the final presidential debate tonight, I implore you to check the facts thrown around by the two candidates.  Both of them stretched the truth at times.  This type of injustice is characteristic of the current political climate, but fact-checking organizations have done their best to rectify this mistake.  It's important to read these and other analyses of their (sometimes outlandish) claims.  These are the first three fact-checking websites I found with a quick Google search; I've been using the first and third ones for the previous debates, and they seem pretty trustworthy.  If you're voting, make sure you are informed on all of the issues!

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/82729.html

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/fact-check-missteps-final-presidential-debate-17540179#.UIYNNIYvniE

http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2012/oct/22/fact-checking-third-presidential-debate/

Best,
Matt

Sandel and Walzer Essays

Click here to download a copy of Michael Sandel's "Democracy's Discontent" and Michael Walzer's "Spheres of Justice."

Friday, October 19, 2012

The Social Contract

The discussions this week focused on the role of government in society, as well as the entitlements of individuals. I think that an important aspect of this question is the structure of humanity. By this I mean, what are some core essential features that relate to the question at hand? The first one I would like to consider is the social aspect of humans. Is being social an important aspect to what it means to be human? It does seem to be. We often place great importance in family, as well as being part of a society that is why we have such large nations. We do unite often and organize ourselves together. If this is the case, we do want to enter social contracts with each other without having to sacrifice other aspects of ourselves, and our self interest. I think that most of us agree that there can be a point where the social contracts that are set-up can infringe too much on the individuals rights. So the question is where is the balance point, where we can receive the most benefit from society, without losing too much of individual liberties. We want to protect ourself interest and to do so we must protect the interest of others. I think that all three philosophers we have looked at agree to this concept, but the balance area is very different between all them. Nozick, I believe, says the only protection that government/society should provide is his idea of One Time Redistribution. Marx says that the people need near protection is a much broader sense. He believes that everyone should get what they need, which society will insure, but self-interest past is not a necessary part of society. Rawls takes a position in between these two. For him government acts as a protection agency like it does for Nozick, but it also acts as provider as it does for Marx. Society tries to help the least advantage in society, but it also does not eliminate competition, or rewards for working hard, intellect, talents, etc.
Out of these three views, they all have their benefits and their detriments. I think that there is no clear choice, nor is there a correct choice for all cases. I think that each of these ideas work for different societies. I think that there are certain countries where Nozicks' idea would not work, and others where Marx's would not work. I think the state of the nation and the thoughts of the people should determine what the role of government is. I guess the best way to classify my thoughts is the genre of the Social Contract. 

Competition in Capitalism


In class, it was noted that because we have grown up in a capitalist society our views of human nature are skewed so that it should seem obvious that our socioeconomic situation is for the best. I find this very interesting when exploring the concepts of competition. Capitalism depends on competitive citizen to contribute to the market economy and produce better goods and more wealth. In turn, this competition carries over into everyday life. It seems that Americans are striving to reach a higher goal or be better in all aspects, trivial as they may be. Joe desires a shinier car than Bill’s car, Bill hopes his kids will get into a more prestigious college than Sarah’s kids, Sarah wants to be more physically fit than Brittany, and so on.
It could be argued from a Marxist point of view that this ambitious attitude, that defines America, is slowly leading it towards decline. Americans are so engrossed with reaching the top that we have lost sight of the importance of supporting the community. Sadly, it is not necessarily frowned upon to achieve greatness by taking short cuts or to the detriment of others. While a few are gaining a great amount being that education, wealth, or happiness, the majority of Americans are losing. This is increasing class struggle. The American middle class who has traditionally been the backbone of our economy is declining and becoming less content. Marx believes that a society ruled by competition through capitalism will eventually turn to ruin, a point that can be easily seen today.
On the other hand, how can we as Americans abandon the competitive drive that brought our country to the top from a universal point? If we did adopt some other idea of human nature, opposing that of “survival of the fittest” would we be generally happier or more content with ourselves? Would we desire more or would the good of the community be sufficient in our acquisitions?
Personally, I find it nearly impossible to imagine a life without competitors and I would question Marx’s idea that human nature is subject to change. Looking at the animal world I clearly see competition for food, mates, and shelter. The animal kingdom is not capitalistic, so what actually causes the seemingly innate attitude of “survival of the fittest”?